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International debt markets after the fi nancial crisis
The authors of this article are Adrian van Rixtel and Luna Romo González of the Associate Directorate General 
International Affairs.
This article describes the changes in the international primary markets for debt in the period dur-
ing which the 2007-2009 fi nancial crisis broke out, gained momentum and spread, placing it in a 
longer time frame. These markets are very important for fi nancing the public and private sectors 
throughout the world and have been severely affected by the crisis. International debt markets 
include many segments, the largest being the bond, syndicated loan and structured fi nance mar-
kets. Chart 1 shows that debt market issuance expanded strongly between 2000 and 2008, 
doubling in volume. Subsequently, they recorded a notable contraction, particularly in the higher-
risk segments which practically disappeared. Particular attention is paid to the analysis of and 
developments in the international structured fi nance markets, since they have played a crucial role 
in the deepest fi nancial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, although space is also 
devoted to issuance on the international bond and syndicated loan markets.
The structured fi nance markets include asset-backed securities, credit derivatives and resecu-
ritisations.1 Among these products, mortgage securitisations, collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs) and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) grew particularly strongly in the years 
leading up to the crisis. It was in these instruments where the problems brought by the crisis 
were incubated and took shape. It is no surprise that their activity has diminished so drasti-
cally in recent years. Subsequently, a moderate recovery has been seen in some segments 
with a relatively high risk level, such as leveraged loan markets, high-yield bonds and, in some 
places, securitisation markets.
The next section briefl y describes how the crisis developed and spread on debt markets. Then 
subsequent sections analyse each of the main markets, beginning with the structured fi nance 
market, given its importance in recent years. The last section presents the conclusions, which 
include most notably the drastic shift in the make-up of debt markets towards bonds, particu-
larly government bonds, to the detriment of structured fi nance markets.
The 2007-2009 fi nancial crisis was preceded by a period of abundant liquidity worldwide, in a 
setting of exceptional macroeconomic stability (also known as the “Great Moderation”) [Mizen 
(2008), Bernanke (2009) and IMF (2009)]. That helped to bring interest rates down to histori-
cally very low levels and to diminish agents’ perception of risk or their caution regarding it. Both 
factors encouraged investors to increasingly seek out higher-return, albeit riskier, investment 
opportunities. This quest could not be satisfi ed by traditional investment opportunities. The 
consequence was growing fi nancial innovation on debt and structured fi nance markets, where 
segments such as asset-backed securities (ABSs), collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and 
other new fi nancial instruments were developed [De Larosière Group (2009) and FSA (2009)]. 
A substantial portion of these was linked directly or indirectly to the US mortgage markets, 
which expanded considerably in parallel with the housing boom there. In particular, the US 
high-risk residential mortgage market grew very rapidly and subprime mortgages became an 
important source of underlying assets for many of the new complex fi nancial instruments [Ash-
craft and Schuermann (2007)].
Introduction
How the fi nancial crisis 
developed and spread
1. Diagram 1 presents an exhaustive classifi cation of structured fi nance instruments.
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From the beginning of 2007, when the housing cycle changed in the United States and, as a 
result the subprime delinquency rate rose, agents began to question the sustainability of this 
situation and to consider possible defi ciencies in risk pricing [Brunnermeier (2009)]. Interna-
tional fi nancial market conditions deteriorated sharply in summer 2007 due to fi nancial institu-
tions’ exposure to US subprime mortgage markets and the related fi nancial instruments. It is 
worth highlighting that the US subprime mortgage markets were simply what triggered the 
crisis and that previously there had been a much more widespread credit boom which encour-
aged excessive indebtedness and risk mispricing on all international fi nancial markets. As risk 
was repriced, the fi nancial strains spread to other segments of the fi nancial markets. This gave 
rise to a fl ight from risky assets throughout the world, particularly those linked to structured or 
opaque fi nance, in favour of safe-haven assets such as government debt. The turmoil also 
spread to short-term markets, as was underlined by the notable rise in risk aversion on the 
ABCP market and the unprecedented rises in interbank money market interest rates [BIS 
(2009)]. These events prompted central banks worldwide to inject substantial liquidity and to 
begin monetary easing. Consequently, the crisis seemed to stabilise and even moderate dur-
ing 2008 H1, although the underlying risks remained.
This picture changed completely on 15 September 2008, when the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers prompted the most serious shock on international fi nancial markets since the Great De-
pression. Confi dence on international debt markets and, in particular, structured fi nance mar-
kets dropped to all-time lows and investors fl ed en masse from complex fi nancial instruments, 
such as asset-backed securities and CDOs. Banks and other fi nancial institutions suffered 
heavy losses and some had to be bailed out by governments. The intensifi cation of the crisis 
led authorities to adopt emergency measures which committed large sums of public money to 
combating the fi nancial crisis. Even so, international fi nancial market conditions did not begin 
to stabilise until March 2009, although the foundations of this stabilisation remained shaky. 
Since then, markets have improved considerably and the appetite for risk has recovered. This 
took the form of a moderate recovery of issuance in relatively high-risk segments of these 
markets such as securitisations placed on the market, high-yield bonds and leveraged loans.
The right-hand side of Chart 1 shows the strong impact of the fi nancial crisis on international 
debt markets in 2007 H2 and in 2008, especially on the issuance of securitisations, CDOs and 
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syndicated loans, which stood at an all-time low. International debt markets recovered consid-
erably during 2009, driven entirely by vigorous bond issuance. In fact, total issuance in these 
markets in 2009 Q1-Q3 has been the highest in their history. Consequently, in spite of the still 
low activity on securitisation, CDO and syndicated loan markets, worldwide debt market issu-
ance in 2009 will possibly set a record high.
Structured fi nance is linked to a group of complex fi nancial instruments and mechanisms and, 
although it is diffi cult to provide a straightforward universal defi nition, it could be described, in 
the broad sense of the term, as the restructuring of cash fl ows to transform the risk, return and 
liquidity characteristics of fi nancial portfolios.2 More specifi cally, structured fi nance consists of 
grouping assets together to subsequently sell them as securities in several “tranches”, each 
with a different risk/return profi le, in order to attract investors with different levels of appetite for 
risk [BIS (2005)]. Division into tranches is important, since by separating the securities into dif-
ferent risk categories, the securities can be adjusted to investors’ specifi c needs and, there-
fore, can be sold more easily. At the same time, it also introduces an element of complexity into 
structured fi nance due to the diffi culty involved in pricing and assessing risk to create these 
tranches.
Structured fi nance is characterised by the complexity of risk transfer instruments and the use 
(and abuse) of special purpose vehicles (SPVs) and special purpose entities (SPEs) by banks 
in off-balance sheet activities. Financial assets, such as residential mortgages, are transformed 
through these vehicles into asset-backed securities (ABSs) which are sold to investors. It 
should be underlined that covered bonds are not considered structured fi nance. The reason 
for this classifi cation is that, unlike in asset-backed securities issued by banks, the underlying 
asset of covered bonds remains on institutions’ balance sheets.
In structured fi nance, the process of division into tranches is a key feature, and, consequently, 
credit rating agencies play an essential role. The ratings provided by these agencies are an 
indicator of the credit (and other) risk associated with the instruments and depend on the 
solvency of the SPV and SPE issuers. In this context, it is customary to distinguish between 
investment grade (IG) rating and below investment grade (high-yield – HY) ratings. According 
to the credit ratings normally used in fi nancial markets, investment-grade structured fi nance 
instruments are rated BBB or higher by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch’s rating services, and Baa 
or higher by Moody’s Investors Service and are associated with lower returns, while below-
investment-grade instruments are associated with relatively higher returns which compensate 
for the higher risk level.
The fi nancial crisis has raised strong doubts about the rating methodologies applied to struc-
tured fi nancial products, in general, and about their soundness, in particular. A posteriori it has 
been seen that many complex instruments had high ratings which were far removed from their 
actual credit quality. Complex and opaque structured fi nance instruments, together with per-
formance-bonus problems at originator institutions and defi ciencies in the credit rating proc-
ess, played a fundamental role in how the fi nancial crisis began, developed and spread [IMF 
(2008), Caprio et al. (2008), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009b), De Larosière Group (2009) and 
FSA (2009)].
Structured fi nance instruments can be classifi ed into the two broad categories of securitisa-
tions and credit derivatives, although some times this separation is not clear-cut and depends 
Structured fi nance 
markets
2. An extensive analysis of structured fi nance is presented in Criado and Van Rixtel (2008) and in Coval et al. (2009).
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on an arbitrary distinction. This diffi culty is particularly patent in collateralised debt obligations 
(CDOs). In simple terms, securitisations are those transactions which consist solely of the 
transformation of cash fl ows; more complex structured fi nance instruments are deemed to be 
credit derivatives. Diagram 1 presents the main structured fi nance instruments, which are 
described in the following sections.3
Securitisation markets comprise short-term asset-backed securities (short-term ABSs, es-
sentially, asset-backed commercial paper — ABCP) and longer-term asset-backed securities 
(long-term ABSs) (see Diagram 1). Broadly speaking, asset-backed securities include three 
Structured fi nance 
securitisations
STRUCTURED FINANCE INSTRUMENTS
SECURITISATIONS: CREATION 
OF ASSET-BACKED 
SECURITIES (ABSs)
STUCTURED FINANCE INSTRUMENTS DIAGRAM 1
SOURCE: Criado and Van Rixtel (2008).
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3. This article will not address more specifi c credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps (CDSs), nor their role in the 
fi nancial crisis. For example, CDSs played an important role in the insurance company, AIG’s problems.
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main categories: mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), narrowly defi ned asset-backed securi-
ties (ABSs which are basically backed by all manner of assets, such as automobile loans, 
student loans, etc., except for mortgages) and cash fl ow collateralised debt obligations [Cria-
do and Van Rixtel (2008)].4
In practice, when the term “asset-backed securities” or the abbreviation “ABSs” is used, the 
markets interpret them according to the narrow defi nition of the term which refers solely to 
asset-backed securities (ABSs) excluding mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) and cash fl ow 
CDOs. MBSs include commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBSs) and residential mort-
gage-backed securities (RMBSs). The mortgages backing RMBSs issues may have high qual-
ity (prime) ratings or low quality (subprime) ratings, depending on the solvency of the respec-
tive borrowers.
Chart 2 displays the changes in international securitisation market issuance, including the 
above-mentioned MBSs, ABSs and cash fl ow CDOs. Charts 3 and 4 provide information on 
securitisations placed on the market and securitisations retained. These charts exclude the 
mortgage securitisations of US agencies which, due to their size, are presented separately in 
Chart 5.
Chart 2 shows very rapid growth of gross issuance on international securitisation markets 
(excluding US agencies) in the last ten years from scarcely $500 bn to $2,617 bn and its fall in 
2007 Q3, which steepened in 2008. In fact, issuance of securitisations in 2008 was less than 
half that in 2006. The main reason for this decline was the crisis of confi dence which hit struc-
tured fi nance and securitisation when major defi ciencies in the assessment (credit rating) and 
transparency of these fi nancial instruments came to light. The chart shows that mortgages 
have clearly been the main underlying asset in securitisations worldwide and, among them, 
residential mortgages are the predominant individual asset.
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4. Cash fl ow CDOs are included here as securitisations for two reasons: fi rstly their fundamental characteristic is the 
specifi c use of “securitisation techniques” to transform a set of assets into new securities; and secondly, several statisti-
cal sources include cash fl ow CDOs under asset-backed securities.
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In the context of the fi nancial crisis and the authorities’ response to it, the distinction between 
securitisations placed on markets and securitisations retained by originators became impor-
tant. As can be observed in Chart 3, the fi nancial crisis especially affected public placement of 
securitisations in all countries, but particularly those originated in the United States. Retained 
securitisations have seen extraordinary growth in the last two years in the euro area and in the 
United Kingdom, due to their acceptance as collateral in central bank liquidity-providing op-
erations, as a result of the fi nancial crisis (see Chart 4). These developments represented a 
fundamental change in the structure of international securitisation markets.
Chart 5 shows changes in the volume of mortgage securitisations issued by US agencies 
(Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Although they fell due to the fi nancial crisis by approximately 
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5% in 2008 to $1,300 bn in 2008, this fi gure is slightly higher than all other securitisations in 
the world, which amounted to $1,188 bn.
Lastly, the data underline that during 2009 Q2 and Q3 international securitisation activity re-
covered from its previous lows, due to the improvement of securitisations placed in the mar-
kets. Retained securitisations fell considerably in 2009 Q2 and stabilised in Q3, partly in re-
sponse to lower collateral requirements in central bank liquidity providing operations. The 
recovery centred on the United States (see Chart 3) and was linked to the commencement of 
the Federal Reserve’s credit support program called the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF). This programme was set up to provide liquidity for credit and consumer ABS 
issues and, subsequently, for certain CMBSs. Furthermore, the issuance of RMBSs in the 
United States (which are not included in TALF) was considerable in 2009 Q2 and Q3, due to 
the growth of issuance by agencies (see Chart 5). This increase was a consequence of sharp 
growth of mortgage securitisations originated under Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
programmes and related to mortgage fi nancing [SIFMA (2009)]. Issuance in the United States 
of private-label MBSs remained very weak.
Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) is a short-term secured fi xed-income instrument 
(commercial paper or CP) issued via conduits (which include structured investment vehicles, 
or SIVs) to fi nance longer-term investments in securities, such as MBSs and CDOs. These 
securities can be considered the collateral underlying the ABCP issued. In other words, they 
are the “asset-backed” component of ABCP.
Chart 6 shows that the ABCP market grew rapidly from 2004 in the US and, similarly, in Eu-
rope. This growth was closely related to the boom in the mortgage markets in general and to 
that in the US mortgage market in particular. According to some estimates, the expansion of 
mortgage ABCP issuance has accounted for half of commercial paper market growth in recent 
years [Mizen (2008)].
The ABCP market was also at the epicentre of the fi nancial crisis, since ABCP conduits had 
invested substantially in complex fi nancial instruments such as ABSs and CDOs, and their 
exposure to complex mortgage-backed fi nancial instruments grew rapidly to an estimated 
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$300 bn [BIS (2007)]. In August 2007, when pressure from the US subprime mortgage mar-
kets spread to the structured fi nance products directly or indirectly related to those markets, it 
became increasingly diffi cult for ABCP issuers to fi nd investors willing to buy these securities, 
even for short periods of time. Hence ABCP programmes faced signifi cant fi nancing problems 
and had to turn to banks for back-up credit lines, which subsequently caused liquidity con-
straints in the banking sector. Further into the crisis, banks had to rescue ABCP conduits and 
absorb their assets into their balance sheets, which fuelled the spread of the crisis from the 
structured fi nance markets to the banking sector. ABCP issuance in the United States in 2009 
Q3 generally remained well below the record highs of 2006 (see Chart 6).
CDOs transform high-risk assets such as loans, mortgages, bonds and asset-backed securi-
ties into a new security. This is done as follows. A number of debt contracts are grouped to-
gether in a SPE/SPV (see preceding section). The CDO liabilities are divided into tranches of 
different credit quality and different levels of subordination, as in the case of asset-backed 
securities. The investors in the tranches of a CDO assume the ultimate exposure to the credit 
risk associated with the underlying reference entities.
Of the structured fi nance instruments, those most affected during the fi nancial crisis were col-
lateralised debt obligations (CDOs), and of these the hardest-hit segment was structured 
CDOs (which essentially consist in securitising other securitisations). For example, structured 
CDOs may be collateralised by an MBS (and then called collateralised mortgage obligations or 
CMOs) or even by other CDOs, and then denoted CDO2.
Structured CDO issues (“structured fi nance” in Chart 7) increased rapidly between 2005 
Q4 and 2007 Q2, in tandem with the rapid growth of the US subprime mortgage markets, 
since considerable volumes of subprime RMBSs were used to collateralise these CDOs. 
The estimates show that the collateral of nearly 50% of highly rated structured CDOs was, 
in fact, subprime mortgage-backed securities; in the case of lower rated asset-backed 
structured CDOs, this percentage was as high as 77% [BIS (2008a)]. When the fi nancial 
crisis broke out, the issuance of structured CDOs collapsed and has not yet recovered. 
Indeed, many analysts do not expect this market segment to recover in the near future. 
Credit derivatives in 
structured fi nance: 
complex collateralised 
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When the problems started in the US subprime mortgage markets in 2007, the CDOs 
based on tranches of mortgage-backed securities linked to the subprime market were also 
negatively affected, and their credit spreads widened spectacularly, giving rise to enormous 
losses for investors. Among the investors were the main originators which had retained 
some of the more highly rated CDO tranches on their balance sheets. The subsequent 
seizing-up of the markets for these products made pricing even more diffi cult and investors 
could not calculate their losses. This added to the growing uncertainty in the international 
debt markets and caused the fi nancial crisis to spread to other fi nancial market segments. 
Thus CDO issuance came to a complete halt worldwide and at end-2008 the CDO market 
or, more specifi cally, that for structured CDOs, had practically ceased to exist.
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Another important segment of CDO markets worldwide is formed by collateralised leveraged 
obligations (CLOs), which are based on the transformation of loans, such as syndicated loans, 
into a new security. CLOs grew rapidly between 2004 and 2007 on the back of surging lever-
aged buy-outs by private equity fi rms in that period. CLOs played a key role in this trend by 
acting as fi nancing instruments (see Chart 8): the loans rated below investment grade (fre-
quently syndicated loans) used to fi nance the leveraged buy-outs were restructured into high-
ly rated CLOs and could thus be placed with a much broader investor base [BIS (2008b), 
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009a), Benmelech et al. (2009)]. In this respect, CLOs were also 
key to the growth of the syndicated loan market. As with structured CDOs, the issuance of 
CLOs declined considerably in 2007 and 2008, and has not yet recovered.
It is of interest to compare developments in the structured fi nance markets and in the more 
traditional bond markets. Total gross bond issuance worldwide increased gradually over the 
last 10 years to more than $10 trillion in 2006, but it declined in 2007 and 2008, albeit in a 
much lower proportion than securitisations did (see Chart 9). The breakdown by issuer shows 
that the fi nancial crisis brought a reduction in issuance by non-fi nancial corporations, particu-
larly in 2008 Q3 and 2008 Q4 (see Chart 10). Access to the international private fi xed-income 
markets became more diffi cult, particularly for riskier companies or those with rankings below 
investment grade. Issuance by fi nancial institutions was very high in 2008 Q4 due to the adop-
tion of government programmes to support fi xed-income issues by credit institutions in various 
countries (see Chart 11).
Bond issues on the international markets rose sharply in the fi rst nine months of 2009, posting 
record highs for similar periods of time ($9.5 trillion). This was due above all to vigorous issu-
ance by government as a result of its increased borrowing. Gross issuance by non-fi nancial 
corporations in the fi rst nine months of 2009 was $1.1 trillion, an unprecedented fi gure nearly 
1.6 times the amount issued in the same period of 2008, when the crisis hit private fi xed-in-
come markets. These issues were partly a consequence of the banking sector’s restrictive 
lending policy worldwide and of a contraction in bank credit which was particularly marked in 
certain major economies in 2009 Q3. Moreover, investors’ appetite for risk improved in 2009, 
stimulating a “search for returns” and spurring the issuance of private fi xed-income securities 
to tap the strong investor demand. 2009 saw two major trends in securities issuance:
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— A marked recovery in issuance activity in the high-yield bond market (bonds rated 
below investment grade, or junk bonds), driven by the step-up in issuance seen 
particularly in the United States (see Chart 12).
— A sharp reduction in government guaranteed bank debt. Bank debt issued 
without a government guarantee grew substantially with respect to that guar-
anteed by the government, particularly in the United States. This converted the 
market for government-guaranteed issues into a niche market (see Chart 11). 
This was related to the Federal Reserve’s criteria for decoupling from govern-
ment fi nancial support, under which banks are required to be able to demon-
strate their ability to access the debt markets without assistance from the 
State.
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Syndicated loans are agreements between a group of banks to grant loans to a specifi c bor-
rower [Gadanecz (2004)]. The syndicated loan market is one of the most international seg-
ments of credit markets and a highly signifi cant source of fi nancing in the world. Syndicated 
loans are commonly used as bridge fi nancing, as interim fi nancing in anticipation of large pri-
vate fi xed-income issues and in the fi nancing of mergers and acquisitions and leveraged buy-
outs (including the acquisition of fi rms by management, or MBOs). A major segment of inter-
national syndicated loan markets is the leveraged loan market. Leveraged loans are generally 
considered to be instruments with a rating below investment grade, although the specifi c 
defi nitions of the various data providers usually differ.
Syndicated loans have become a signifi cant segment of the international debt markets in the 
last 10 years (see Chart 13). The grew particularly from 2004 because they played a basic role 
in fi nancing the strong growth of M&As and of leveraged buy-outs (see Chart 14). The use of 
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syndicated loans in leveraged buy-outs gave rise to strong growth of leveraged loans (see 
Chart 15), which provided the collateral for the rapidly growing CLO market (described else-
where).
In these circumstances the international syndicated loan market was hit particularly hard by 
the fi nancial crisis and issuance underwent a drastic fall which continued in 2009. Indeed, in 
2009 Q3 the total number of syndicated loans granted worldwide dropped to the lowest level 
since 2004 Q1. The factors behind this fall were the restrictive credit standards applied by 
banks active in syndicated lending, the ongoing process of deleveraging in the world banking 
sector and the issuance of bonds by non-fi nancial corporations insofar as these are an alterna-
tive fi xed-income instrument to syndicated loans. Despite the scant issuance in syndicated 
loan markets, a signifi cant development was the recovery in 2009 of issuance activity in the 
riskiest segment of the international syndicated loan markets, namely leveraged loans. This 
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recovery can be explained by the improvement in the general market climate and by the in-
creasing appetite for risk, which had a benefi cial effect on issuance in other segments of the 
international debt markets with a higher risk level.
The 2007-2009 fi nancial crisis had a strong impact on issuance activity in the international 
debt markets and prompted signifi cant adjustments in their structure. The fi nancial instru-
ments most closely related to the build-up and subsequent abrupt correction of some of the 
fi nancial excesses, e.g. those related to the high-risk mortgage boom in the United States and 
those linked to corporate acquisitions with leveraged fi nance, were the ones hardest hit by the 
crisis and those where its effects have persisted most. These products include most notably 
CDOs, ABCP and syndicated loans.
By contrast, the impact of the crisis on the bond markets was much more moderate, although 
it depended strongly on the type of issuer. Thus issues by fi nancial institutions dropped sub-
stantially despite government support in the form of guarantees, while non-fi nancial corpora-
tions were more immune, partly because they were forced to issue bonds to compensate for 
the constraints on loan fi nancing. Meanwhile, government bond issuance multiplied as a result 
of the sharp increase in borrowing needs and the high demand for low-risk securities.
These developments led to a shift in the issue structure in favour of the government bond 
markets and at the expense of the structured fi nance and syndicated loan markets. By way of 
a summary, Chart 16 shows the composition of international debt market issues in 2009 Q3 
and in the same quarter of 2006, just before the crisis broke out in summer 2007. The percent-
age of bonds rose sharply from 56% in 2006 to 70% in 2009, basically due to higher govern-
ment issuance, which represented nearly half of the total gross issuance on world debt mar-
kets. Also, the share accounted for by non-fi nancial corporation bonds rose signifi cantly (up 
from 5% to 7%), while that of fi nancial institution bonds dropped markedly (down from 28% to 
15%). Lastly, the percentages of securitisations and of syndicated loans decreased sharply 
from 12% to 5% and from 23% to 12%, respectively.
Contrary to what might be expected, the size of the world debt markets did not contract sig-
nifi cantly. Despite the weakness of the structured fi nance markets, total debt market issuance 
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recovered strongly to $13.5 trillion up to September, with an unprecedented level of issuance 
on the international bond markets. This recovery, however, does not refl ect a normalisation of 
fi nancial conditions, since the steep increase in issuance is highly infl uenced by the expansion 
of government bond offerings and the rerouting of corporate fi nancing from bank credit to debt 
securities under circumstances which favour demand for both types of instrument.
Lastly, it bears repeating that the fi nancial crisis was closely linked to the rapid growth of spe-
cifi c segments of the international structured fi nance markets and the subsequent loss of 
confi dence in them. This serves as a reminder that, although fi nancial innovation can improve 
the effi ciency of services and of fi nancial markets and the access to them, it can also pose 
risks, especially when applied at an ever-faster pace in an environment of abundant liquidity 
worldwide and without suffi cient checks that it works properly. A fi tting observation in this re-
spect was made by Charles Calomiris, who noted that the deepest fi nancial crises tend to 
occur when rapid growth of untested fi nancial innovations coincides with fi nancial markets in 
expansion [Calomiris (2008)].
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